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THE TOPOGRAPHY OF DIVINE LOVE: 
A REPLY TO THOMAS TALBOTT 
Jeff Jordan 
Does God love every human equally and to the deepest degree possible? In 
an earlier article 1 argued that no one could, in principle, love every human 
equally and to the deepest degree possible. Thomas Talbott has objected and 
argues that a model of the divine love extended equally to all best captures 
the idea of God as loving parent. 1 contend that Talbott's argument fails, 
in part, as it implies that the divine love treats the interests of humans as 
fungible. 
Thomas Talbott has recently defended proposition (L) in response to sev-
eral arguments 1 presented against it: 
(L): 1f G o d exists and is perfect, then God's love must be maximally extended 
and equally intense. 1 
According to (L), the topography of God's love must be as wide as possible 
by having every human as its object, and as flat as possible, wi th every 
human an equal recipient. The flatness requirement should be understood 
to require not just equality but also maximal intensity—every human is 
loved by G o d to the same maximally significant degree (depth, one might 
say, as well as flatness and wideness). 2 Proposition (L), then, should be un¬
derstood as implying that every human is deeply loved by God, and that 
G o d equally loves every human, and that G o d loves every human to the 
maximal degree possible. Denying (L), then, need not imply, for instance, 
that there are humans not loved by God, or that G o d not does love every 
human equally, or that G o d does not love deeply. While these would be 
sufficient for denying (L), they are not necessary. 
H o w might one understand God's love? 1n the sense relevant here, 
divine love w i l l have at least two conceptually necessary features: the first 
consists of G o d having a disinterested concern for his beloved, while the 
second involves G o d taking as his own, or identifying with, the interests of 
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the one loved. 3 Of course, given the first feature, it follows that G o d would 
identify wi th no interest incompatible wi th the beloved's well-being. The 
first feature—having a disinterested concern for the well-being of one's 
beloved—serves as a check on the second, since love does not require 
identifying wi th interests harmful or destructive or immoral. Moreover, it 
is plausible to understand the conjunction of the two features as implying 
that there is a proportionate relationship between the two components, 
and the degree of love—that is, as one's concern for S increases and as 
one's identification wi th the interests of S increases, so too does one's love 
toward S.4 
Professor Talbott holds that G o d is properly understood as the loving 
parent of every created person, and that the divine parental love must 
be equal and maximally intense, and so Talbot seeks to defend (L). His 
defense of (L) rests in large part on the concept of "maximally extended 
parental love" which Professor Talbott describes as "a property one exem-
plifies only when one's love extends maximally and with equal intensity 
to every person that one freely chooses to bring into being, whether it 
be through procreation or outright creation." 5 Wi th Professor Talbott, 
let's call this property (PL). There is however a problem wi th Talbott's 
formulation of (PL): parents could exemplify (PL) without deeply loving 
their children, as long as they do so in a uniform way. Suppose Jones 
only slightly loves his three children, but does so in a uniform and equal 
way. Jones would have exemplified (PL) even though his parental love 
would be far f rom commendable. But let's set aside this quibble, as Talbott 
holds that G o d understood as having maximally extended parental love 
is superior to any model of the divine love which denies that G o d has that 
property.6 1s Professor Talbott right about that? 
1t w i l l facilitate matters if we adopt a k ind of test to evaluate various 
models of divine parental love. Our test w i l l employ the principle: 
(PT): the quality of divine parental love for created persons at least 
equals that of the best human parental love. 
3 This characterization of love is influenced by the analysis of love found in Har ry G . 
Frankfurt , The Reasons of Love (Princeton, NJ : Princeton Universi ty Press, 2004), 79-80. 
4 One may wonder if there are various sorts of love and, if so, the relevance of this variety 
for the discussion. A s it is hard to see how any sort of love (of persons) could fail to incor¬
porate the two features of the lover having a disinterested concern for her beloved, and the 
lover taking as her own, or ident i fying wi th , the interests of the beloved, 1 set aside this issue. 
5Talbott, "The Topography of Div ine Love: A Response to Jeff Jordan," 304. 
6 Another quibble: Professor Talbott champions exemplifying (LC), a property one has 
only by loving equally and impartial ly every Christian (see p. 310). But it is far f rom clear 
that one should exemplify (LC). Suppose Jones is the father of Smith. Jones seeks to exem¬
pl i fy (LC) by loving every Christian in the wor ld equally and impartially. K n o w i n g that 
pious lip-service is worth little, he divides his resources, attentions and affections as equally 
as he can by various measures, all of wh ich detract f rom Jones's resources and attentions 
and affections being spent principally or partially on Smith. 1t is far f rom clear that Jones's 
attempt to exemplify (LC) is prudent or morally commendable or approaches the ideal of the 
best human parenting mentioned in (PT), since, for one thing, it seems that Smith has cause 
for a k ind of rational resentment toward Jones. 
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While no doubt vague at points, principle (PT) stipulates that God's 
love, considered as a k ind of parental love, is at least as good as that mani¬
fested by exemplary human parents. Theists, of course, typically hold 
that God's love, whether v ia its quality or manifestations, far exceeds that 
characteristic of the very best of human love, but (PT) requires only parity 
and not superiority. 1nvoking (PT), a Talbottian might claim that a maxi-
mally extended and equally intense love—one perfectly wide and flat and 
deep—is the only model of divine love which passes muster. 
But what if that Talbottian claim is an assertion of the impossible? What 
if, that is, it is not possible in-principle to love every person uniformly to the 
same significant degree? Why would loving maximally and equally every 
person not be possible? Well, different people have different interests. 
A n d , if we hold that love has as a necessary constituent identifying wi th 
the interests of one's beloved, then there w i l l be an in-principle obstacle, 
as no one can knowingly and rationally take as his own incompatible in¬
terests. We might understand an interest of a person as something the 
person cares about, or something the person should care about. 1denti-
fying wi th an interest we might understand as, roughly, caring about what 
one's beloved cares about because one's beloved cares about it, or caring 
about what one's beloved should care about because one's beloved should 
care about it. Two interests are incompatible just in case attempts to bring 
about one of them require that the other be impeded. Suppose you have 
an ample supply of tickets to an event, which both Smith and Jones greatly 
desire to attend. But Smith w i l l attend only if Jones does not. Al though 
you prefer going with both, you decide to attend with Jones even though 
you know this means Smith w i l l not attend. To secure the interests of one 
may entail thwarting those of another. 
Professor Talbott responds by distinguishing between best interests 
and perceived interests, and he contends that love involves caring about 
the best interests of one's beloved, and if the best interests of persons are 
compossible, then a way is open to evade my argument f rom differing 
interests contra (L). 7 1n my earlier paper 1 suggested that never suffering 
solely for the benefit of another is among the best interests of persons, 
and if G o d must permit suffering i n order to achieve some divine pur-
pose, then it could well be, for all we know, that by permitting suffering 
G o d may not be able to identify with the best interests of all persons. But 
whether that interest is among the best interests of persons or not, the 
relevance for the issue at hand of the distinction between perceived or 
mere interests and best interests is far f rom clear. 
For one thing, it is not obvious that identifying only with the best inter¬
ests of the beloved is characteristic of an exemplary parent, even though 
identifying wi th the beloved's interests is characteristic. A child has among 
her best interests that she be the primary object of her parents' loving 
7 B y "perceived interests" presumably Professor Talbott means interests which are not 
among one's best interests. 
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attentions. So, each of two siblings would have this among their respective 
best interests, and yet a loving parent could not identify with that best 
interest in both cases. 
But set this point aside, as the assumption that the best interests of one 
person are wholly consonant with those of every other person calls for 
examination. Let's understand the best interests of a person to be those 
interests that the person should care about, whether or not she knows 
those are her best interests, and whether she even in fact cares about 
those interests.8 Consider Jones, a participant in a scholarship pageant in 
which only one contestant w i l l receive a fu l l scholarship to a university—a 
scholarship vital to Jones's future. When queried about his interests and 
aspirations as part of the competition, Jones catalogues the usual suspects: 
wor ld peace and the sustainability of the environment, let's suppose. 
While wor ld peace and environmental sustainability are arguably ranked 
among Jones's best interests, so too is winning the contest, as that state of 
affairs is vital to his future (it is, we might suppose, the sole feasible posi¬
tive alternative he has), even if it would be impolitic for h i m to mention 
it while answering the query. 1t is obvious that among the best interests 
any of us have are some compossible with those had by all others. But it is 
also clear that some are not—Jones's best interest in winning the pageant 
is not compatible wi th the best interests of the other contestants as it is in 
each of their best interests to w i n the pageant also. 1f there are zero-sum 
situations of any sort the winning of which is among the best interests of 
more than one person, then conflict among the best interests of persons is 
not just possible, but unavoidable. 
But let's set aside the issue of whether the best interests of all persons 
are compatible—which 1 deny but a Talbottian endorses—as it is disposi-
tive to note that any love, the divine included, which identified wi th only 
those interests of a beloved child interchangeable with those of every other 
child would run afoul of (PT). The best human parenting identifies not just 
wi th the beloved's best interests but also wi th many of the beloved's less-
than-best interests. The two constituent features of love, as noted, entail 
that love does not require identifying with interests harmful or destruc¬
tive to the beloved. But, of course, one can have real interests which are 
not among one's best interests and are neither harmful nor destructive. 
These real but less than the best interests we might call "secondary inter¬
ests." Suppose a parent had two children both of whose best interests the 
parent seeks to identify with, as best he can, and seeks to advance. But that 
parent also identifies wi th and seeks to advance the secondary interests 
of one child, but not the other child. This apparent favoritism or deeper 
identification with one child over the other would be hard to square wi th 
the claim that the parent equally loves both. So, holding that the divine 
8 C o u l d there be interests a person should care about even though they are not among her 
best interests? 1f there could be, then understanding best interests as interests one should 
care about is a necessary but not sufficient property. 
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love identifies only with the best interests of created persons, and that the 
best interests of each are fungible with those of every other, has the divine 
love fall ing short of the love characteristic of the best of human parenting. 
Moreover, no one could credibly hold that the secondary interests of 
persons do not conflict, as there clearly are zero-sum situations the win¬
ning of which is among the interests of persons—going to the event is in 
the interests of both Smith and Jones, let's suppose, but as there is only 
one ticket remaining, they both cannot attend. Considering secondary in-
terests, conflict is not just possible, as Talbott concedes, but unavoidable. 9 
The affirmation of (L) v ia (PL) runs counter of (PT) in a second way. 
Suppose, for example, that one held that salvation is the sole best interest 
of every human, and that universal salvation was possible, and in that 
way, sought to support (L). Cou ld G o d identify with this single best in¬
terest of each created person? Perhaps so, but if that is the only interest 
that G o d identifies with, then it is hard to see how G o d could be said 
to deeply love humans, since, arguably, the more interests one identifies 
wi th and the greater the concern for one's beloved, the more deeply one 
loves that beloved. So, G o d would not love humans i n the deepest way. 
1n addition, if G o d identifies only wi th those best interests common to all 
humans, then G o d would not love individuals as regards their particu¬
larity and singularity. Exemplifying (PL) would require, in effect, that G o d 
treat humans as interchangeable, as G o d would identify only wi th those 
interests identical wi th the interests of all others. But exemplary human 
parents treat neither their children nor their children's interests as fun¬
gible. So, if G o d identifies only wi th those interests common to all, then 
G o d does not deeply love humans, or G o d does not love individuals as 
regards their particularity and singularity. Either way, principle (PT) has 
again been violated. 
But could G o d treat the interests of persons as fungible while at the 
same time not treating those individuals as being fungible? That is, could 
G o d love individuals in their particularity or singularity, while identifying 
only with those interest common to all persons? No: if we understand 
love as, in part, identifying wi th the beloved's interests, then no one could 
identify only wi th those interests of Jones common to all others and yet 
love Jones as a particular individual . 1 0 One could of course deny that love 
has as a conceptual part the identification by the lover wi th the interests 
of her beloved. 1t is especially hard, however, to see a plausible reason for 
denying that parental love implies such identification. 1f identification is 
a necessary part of parental love, then it is clear that exemplifying (PL) 
would disqualify the divine love f rom matching the quality of love found 
'See "The Topography of Div ine Love: A Response to Jeff Jordan," 312-313. 
1 0 Whi le more needs to be said here, it is important to note that love focusing, at least in 
part, on the particularity and singularity of individuals explains, in part, w h y a universal 
and impartial love, wi th no variance, cannot be the deepest k ind of love. The deepest k ind of 
love involves a k ind of exclusivity or partially and does not devalue the beloved by treating 
her, in effect, as a fungible. A perfectly flat love, that is, cannot have the greatest depth. 
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among the best human parents and, consequently, Talbott's primary case 
for (L) v ia the concept of maximally extended love fails. 
Professor Talbott also supports (L) by a k ind of transitivity of love argu¬
ment: 
P1: if S loves S*, then, for any person P, if P loves S then P must also 
love S*. 
A n d , 
P2: for any person S, S w i l l love someone and w i l l be loved by someone. 
So, 
C1: every person w i l l be loved equally and ful ly as any other. 1 1 
What should we say about (P1)-(C1)? The first premise looks manifestly 
false: suppose Jones loves Juliet and is a rival wi th Greene for her hand. 1n 
fact, Juliet loves Greene. Does it fol low f rom loving Juliet, that Jones must 
also love Greene, his rival for her hand? This seems doubtful. Or suppose 
Juliet's love for Greene is pathological or harmful or imprudent. 1t surely 
cannot be that Jones too must love Greene, or w i l l that Juliet love Greene. 
Additionally, the inference of (C1) f rom (P1) and (P2) is invalid, as (P2) can 
be satisfied even if Greene and Juliet love only each other, and are loved 
by no one else. 
Finally, Professor Talbott suggests that my arguments against (L) are 
reminiscent of a statement of Calvin: "For as Jacob, deserving nothing by 
good works, is taken into grace, Esau, as yet undefiled by any crime, is 
hated." 1 2 1t may be of interest, however, to recall that Thomas Aquinas also 
formulated and presented an argument contra (L), so arguing against (L) 
may not suffice to paint one a Calvinist (not that there's anything wrong 
with that . . .). 1 3 But in any case, to be fair to Calvin, the remark quoted by 
Professor Talbott is simply Calvin's paraphrase of Romans 9:13—a troubling 
verse no doubt for any who embrace (L). 1 4 
University of Delaware 
111 have substituted "loves" for "wil ls the best" in my reconstruction of Talbott's argu¬
ment, since our discussion is about love, and we have been given no reason to hold that love 
and w i l l i n g the best are interchangeable. See Talbott, "The Topography of Divine Love: A 
Response to Jeff Jordan," 315. 
1 2Talbott, "The Topography of Div ine Love: A Response to Jeff Jordan," 302. 
1 3See Summa Theologica, 1ae, Q. 20, A . 3 . 
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